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The Capital Punishment Controversy in Hungary:  
Fragments on the Issues of Deterrent Effect and  
Wrongful Convictions
Zoltan J. Toth*
Department of Legal Sociology and Philosophy, Faculty of Law and Political Sciences  
at the University of Szeged, Szeged, Hungary
Although the death penalty has been abolished in the majority of the European 
countries by now (it is only applied in Belarus, while Russia can be considered a 
so-called de facto abolitionist state, where this sanction exists in theory, but no 
execution has taken place in the last fifteen years and, according to the current 
situation, will not take place anymore), the debates concerning capital punish-
ment keep arising. In many European countries leading politicians argue or have 
recently argued in favour of reinstatement of the death penalty and not only the 
leaders of extremist parties (such as Ján Slota, former president of the Slovakian 
SNS,1 in 2010, or Jean-Marie Le Pen, former president of the French FN2 and his 
daughter Marine Le Pen, former vice-president, currently president of the party, 
in 2007), but moderate (mainly conservative) politicians as well. Similarly, Lech 
Kaczyński, Poland’s deceased president, advocated an European debate regard-
ing the reintroduction of capital punishment in 2006; his twin brother, Jarosław 
Kaczyński, former prime minister and currently president of the leading opposi-
tion party, the PiS,3 announced at the end of 2011 that one of the objectives of his 
party was also to reinstate the death penalty. Daniel Lipšic, former Slovakian 
* E-mail: tothz@juris.u-szeged.hu.
1) Slovenská národná strana (Slovak National Party).
2) Front National (National Front).
3) Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (Law and Justice).
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Minister of Justice, also raised the issue at the beginning of 2008 and John Arthur 
Stevens, former head of the Metropolitan Police Service (better known as Scotland 
Yard) in England, also declared after the murder of a policewoman in 2005, that 
although he was against capital punishment before, the only acceptable response 
to brutal murders is death. All these persons were in favour of the death penalty, 
partly for moral reasons and partly for practical considerations believing that cap-
ital punishment has a deterrent effect and would serve to actually decrease the 
number of murders.
The debate related to capital punishment keeps arising in Hungary as well, 
especially after brutal murders. Various politicians stated that, according to their 
personal opinion, the reinstatement of the death penalty would be expedient or 
proper, or that it should not have been abolished in the first place. For example, 
Hungary’s current prime minister, Viktor Orbán, spoke in a radio interview back in 
May 2002, when he first served as prime minister (between 1998–2002), still in his 
capacity as PM, that after having met the relatives of the murdered victims of the 
recent Mor bank robbery his opinion regarding the death penalty had changed, 
and while he had been against it before, now he would be in favour thereof. He 
also declared that he is aware that Hungary would not be able to join the European 
Union4 if it would maintain or reinstall the death penalty, but he believed the 
EU was changing as well and there may come a time when the EU — for instance, 
in the fight against terrorism — will once again permit this kind of sanction. 
According to Mr. Orbán, Hungary should be amongst those countries in Europe 
which argue that the death penalty should once again fall within the scope of 
national legislation.
The last time when a hot debate on capital punishment started in Hungary was 
in 2012: first in July 2012, when a young, pretty police psychologist was raped and 
murdered in Pécs, and then in the late autumn of 2012, when the body of an 
11-year-old boy was found, a few days after he went missing on 30 October 2012, 
and it was established that the boy was murdered with premeditation (it is 
suspected that his foster-mother had him beaten to death by two homeless men). 
Following these cases not only common people started demanding the reintro-
duction of capital punishment (e.g., tens of thousands of people on Facebook), but 
many celebrities expressed their opinion as well, and numerous politicians also 
openly criticised the present regulation which does not allow the imposition of 
the death penalty and the execution of brutal murderers. The loudest, of course, 
was the extreme right-wing party, the JOBBIK, which includes the reinstatement 
of capital punishment in its official programme since its foundation and which 
received 17% of the votes in the parliamentary elections of 2010; the true novelty, 
4) Hungary was not yet a member of the EU in 2002, it joined the European Union on 1 May 2004.
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however, was that a number of politicians of the currently governing parties also 
openly supported the revival of executions in practice. As such, a smaller group 
within FIDESZ, the larger governing party, composed of members of the former 
Independent Smallholders, Agrarian Workers and Civic Party who switched to 
FIDESZ, declared that in the parliament they would be proposing the modifica-
tion of the Criminal Code such as to actually allow capital punishment in the 
future (such a bill was not presented to the parliament, in the end); furthermore, 
several Members of Parliament of the smaller governing party, the KDNP,5 made 
statements supporting the reintroduction of the death penalty. Their reasons 
were the same as those of the European supporters, namely that the application of 
the death penalty would be necessary since it would deter some of the potential 
murderers from committing their crime; on the other hand, the argument that 
“society should not support murderers” lately appears regularly in the public opin-
ion (and even in articles of certain newspapers), that is — they believe —, that the 
death penalty is cheaper than life imprisonment, which is another reason sup-
porting the need for its reinstatement. Considering that these arguments not only 
appear from time to time, but the social pressure to reintroduce the death penalty 
has expressly grown in the past years (at least in Hungary), a growing number of 
the professional politicians would now be willing to give in to this pressure if it 
was not outlawed by international treaties (especially the Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its Protocols No. 6 
and 13, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Sec-
ond Optional Protocol thereto) and the European Union. As such, it is not out of 
place to consider the arguments regarding the death penalty and investigate their 
validity, primarily in light of the Hungarian data and trends.
As to the controversy over capital punishment, two fundamental types of 
dispute — along with the two kinds of reasoning supporting them — that centre 
on the appropriateness or applicability of the death penalty can be differentiated. 
There exist, on the one hand, philosophical or moral, and, on the other hand, 
pragmatic (empirical and logical) reasons. Pragmatic arguments are character-
ised by impartiality and objectivity resting on solid, empirical, and at least partly 
supervisable grounds. As opposed to this, moral arguments are not formed on the 
basis of such requirements; therefore, they cannot be regarded as par excellence 
rational arguments by nature. Ethical viewpoints rest on profound beliefs that 
one accepts as axioms, in other words, one has a particular opinion of something 
without backing it up logically either by means of listing supporting evidence or 
refuting its counterarguments. The essence of morality lies in its status as the 
innermost, unquestionable and indisputable, hence, undeniable (that is, immune 
5) Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt (Christian Democratic People’s Party).
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to refute) part of the human psyche which is best described by the word “belief”;6 
and nothing can dissuade those who “believe” from their own presuppositions and 
convictions.7 Hence, if someone “believes” that the ultimate moral principle is to 
rid society of the “evil”, that is, of those people who are dangerous and purpose-
fully trespass, posing a threat to their fellow, law-abiding citizens, and that the 
only proper way to do that is for such a trespasser to receive punishment in the 
same form as they have offended because there is no treatment more just than 
that, then this person will claim with a solid moral conviction that the death pen-
alty is an appropriate form of punishment. At the same time, those of the opposite 
viewpoint who think that no human has the right to make judgments over other 
humans and that life is so sacred and invaluable, so that it is forbidden to take it 
away in an “ethical” society, even from those people who deliberately took away 
others’ life out of their own immorality, will emphasise the legitimacy of their own 
beliefs with the same vehemence. The debate between everyday people — and 
also between professionals with their points elaborated in a more sophisticated 
argumentation — on capital punishment rests on such moral grounds, which 
results in the mutual, conscious ignorance of the other party’s reasoning and a 
shift from the point under discussion to personal disagreements, rendering the 
studies dealing with the death penalty as weapons of a philosophical jihad rather 
than inferences based on rational research. Since moral arguments as enuncia-
tions of beliefs cannot be studied rationally, that is, — to put it more simply — 
they do not meet scientific criteria,8  I will not discuss the pure forms of the argu- 
ments raised in connection with the death penalty9 in this paper.
However, the empirical points of discussion concerning the death penalty also 
enable to extremely polarise the various standpoints of people. This is equally true 
for the issue of the deterrent effect, the possibility of wrongful convictions, the 
6) The word “belief” is not used to mean or refer to faith here, it stands as a synonym for any aprior-
istic point of view.
7) As a result, moral conviction as belief is irrational, which simply means that, as far as its genesis is 
concerned, it is not a consequence of something but it depends on an aprioristic choice of values 
(that is, there is no rational reason or logical verification behind it).
8) The scientific criterion — in contradiction with its older conception — is not verifiability, 
but, instead, falsifiability. It follows from this that an assertion cannot be regarded as a scientific 
statement if it does not — not even in theory — leave any room for proving (unavoidably only tem-
porarily, owing to the current perception of what is scientific) its falseness (in the presence of appro-
priate conditions). Therefore, moral arguments do not constitute any part of science (just like any 
other declaration or conviction formed on beliefs).
9) Clearly, many rational arguments build on a more or less moral base. Nevertheless, this does not 
necessarily entail that these are “moral” arguments, so it should come as no surprise if moral ele-
ments do occur in some or even in most of the upcoming examples that are to be analysed without 
one having the obligation to call their rational/empirical nature into question because of this.
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matter of humanity or inhumanity of the individual methods of execution applied 
nowadays,10 the existing or non-existing discrimination in the judicial process11  
or even for the financial aspects.12
The practical arguments concerning the applicability or non-applicability of 
capital punishment need to be divided into two distinct categories: relevant and 
non-relevant arguments. While the former, either in themselves or through their 
relationship with one another, may be used to prove the standpoint of retention 
or that of abolition, the latter — regardless of what the truth is about them — 
cannot even in theory serve as a rationale for taking a position in the discussion of 
10) As for this issue, see, e.g.: from the abolitionist side: M.J. Borg and M.L. Radelet, ‘On botched 
executions’, in P. Hodgkinson and W.A. Schabas (eds), Capital Punishment. Strategies for Aboli­
tion  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 143–168; from the retentionist side: 
D.O. Friedrichs, ‘Humanism and the death penalty: an alternative perspective’, 6 Justice Quarterly 
(1989), 197–209.
11) On the matter of discrimination, see, e.g.: M.E. Wolfgang, and M. Riedel, ‘Racial Dicrimination, 
Rape and the Death Penalty’, in H.A. Bedau (ed.), The Death Penalty in America (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, ), pp. 194–205; P. Hodgkinson, ‘Capital punishment: improve it or remove it?’, in 
Hodgkinson and Schabas, Capital Punishment. Strategies for Abolition, pp. 1–35; R.J. Tabak and 
J.M. Lane, ‘The execution of injustice: a cost and lack-of-benefit analysis of the death penalty’, 23 
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review (1989), 59–146; W.S. White, ‘The death penalty in the nineties: an 
examination of the modern system of capital punishment’ (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan 
Press, 1991), pp. 135–163; R. Paternoster, Capital Punishment in America (New York, NY: Lexington 
Books, 1991), pp. 115–160; W.J. Bowers and G.L. Pierce, ‘Racial discrimination and criminal homicide 
under post-Furman capital statutes’, in Bedau, The Death Penalty in America, pp. 206–224; W.O. 
Hochkammer Jr., ‘The capital punishment controversy’, in J.A. McCafferty (ed.), Capital Punishment 
(Chicago, IL: Aldine-Atherton, 1972), pp. 65–87; H. Schwarzchild, In Opposition to Death Penalty 
Legislation, in Bedau, The Death Penalty in America, pp. 364–370; S.L. Gross, ‘Race and death: the 
judicial evaluation of evidence of discrimination in capital sentencing’, 18 University of California 
Davis Law Review (1984–1985), 1275–1325; B. Stevenson, ‘Close to death: reflections on race and capital 
punishment in America’, in H.A. Bedau and P.G. Cassell (eds.), Debating the Death Penalty (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 76–116; C.J. Ogletree, ‘Black man’s burden: race and the death 
penalty in America’, 81 Oregon Law Review (2002), 15–38; S.B. Bright, ‘Discrimination, death and 
denial: the tolerance of racial discrimination in infliction of the death penalty’, 35 Santa Clara Law 
Review (1994–1995), 433–483; W.J. Bowers, ‘The pervasiveness of arbitrariness and discrimination 
under Post-Furman capital statutes’, 74 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology (1983), 1067–1100. 
For the simple inherent capriciousness of the death penalty, see: R.A. Berk, R. Weiss and J. Boger, 
‘Chance and the death penalty’, 27 Law and Society Review (1993), 89–110.
12) It should be shocking, at least at first glance, that, according to every survey, the existence of 
capital punishment in a given legal system induces more expenditure than if this legal institution 
did not exist at all. For the real costs of the death penalty, see, e.g.: Paternoster, op. cit., pp. 187–216; 
R.L. Spangenberg and E.R. Walsh, ‘Capital punishment or life imprisonment: some cost consider-
ations’, 23 Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review (1989–1990), 45–58; R.C. Dieter, ‘Millions misspent: 
what politicians don’t say about the high costs of the death penalty’, available online at: http://www 
.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=45&did=385; Tabak and Lane, op. cit., pp. 133–138; M. Garey, 
‘The cost of taking a life: dollars and sense of the death penalty’, 18 University of California Davis Law 
Review (1984–1985), 1221–1273.
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the death penalty’s acceptability. This latter category includes (among many other 
reasons of secondary importance) arguments pertaining to par excellence eco-
nomic (i.e., pecuniary) aspects or arguments in connection with the public’s sup-
port, and since these attributes are by nature defined or influenced by a particular 
legal system, one can only make inferences about the state of the actual legal sys-
tem in question but not about capital punishment as such. It follows from this that 
the arguments dealing with these issues are only valid as long as the circumstances 
in which they arose persist, and, as soon as a change occurs in the legal situation, 
they lapse. Results obtained from the debates associated with the above-specified 
viewpoints cannot be perceived as conclusive arguments with regards to the 
theoretical discussion of the death penalty also because they only take into con-
sideration marginal aspects thereof instead of the crucial questions that should 
be raised. Accordingly, this paper primarily deals with these crucial questions, 
namely, the topic of the alleged deterrent effect of capital punishment and the 
possibility of wrongful convictions,13 concentrating, principally but not exclu-
sively, on the Hungarian scene.
First of all, as to the contingent deterrent effect of the penalty of death, lots of 
law scholars, criminologists, economists and, as a part of this latter, statisticians 
attempted to find whether there is (in deed) a deterrent effect of the death penalty 
or not. These attempts are of two sorts. The first kind of examination is based on 
a priori logic, supplemented by the concern of the pure number of murders and 
executions and the change thereof. The second kind are based on precisely pre-
pared and conducted multifactor econometric surveys. In the first part of this 
paper I am going to examine the former based on the example of Hungary.
As for the a priori logic, there are two points of view competing with each other. 
The so-called retentionists or revivalists, namely, the advocates of capital punish-
ment, deem that the more severe a penalty is (imposed on a perpetrator), the 
greater the fear of the consequences of a crime will be. They argue like this: “I do 
not want to be fined 100 dollars. I even less want to be fined 1000 dollars, even less 
punished with one year prison, even less with prison for life and least of all to be 
sentenced to death”.14 In contrast to this, the abolitionists, that is, the opponents 
13) Considering that a meaningful conclusion may only be drawn from the analysis of these issues if 
the alleged deterrent effect of the death penalty and the irreparable consequences of wrongful con-
victions are placed within the context of a criminal punishment that may serve as a potential and 
suitable alternative to capital punishment, at the end of my study I shall briefly discuss the situation 
of life imprisonment in Hungary, especially that of real life sentence.
14) For instance, according to Alexander Deak, capital punishment has a greater deterrent effect 
than life imprisonment, since it is final and irrevocable and there is no possibility of escape. Life 
imprisonment holds some hope (although very small) for freedom, either by means of escaping 
from prison or hoping for pardon from the President. Deak does believe that the threat of irre-
vocable death is in fact more dreadful than “normal” life imprisonment that does not last forever 
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of capital punishment, take the different types of murder and try to prove that in 
the cases of most of these the nature of the punishment does not affect the moti-
vation of potential perpetrators.15 For example, it does not impact on crimes of 
passion.16 These criminals, according to the abolitionists, do not deliberate in 
(only twenty or thirty years) or actual life imprisonment, which might not last a lifetime (due to the 
possibility of escape from prison or pardon). As he puts it: “I believe the view that a real criminal 
would not be deterred by capital punishment is not correct. On this basis, the entire Criminal Code 
should be repealed, as a notorious thief or fraud would not be deterred by punishment” (cf., A. Deak, 
‘On capital punishment’ [A halálbüntetésről], Belügyi Szemle (1995/1), 55–57). Furthermore: “In my 
opinion a person who virtually excludes himself from society by committing a murder deserves 
the death penalty. … Regardless of any contrary statement, I firmly believe that capital punishment 
has a deterrent — i.e. preventive — effect…” (Ibid., pp. 55–56). György Pálinkás, late Justice of the 
Supreme Court of Hungary, had a similar opinion; according to him, if even the death penalty had no 
deterrent effect, then no other punishment would have it. If even the most severe punishment can-
not deter a person from committing a crime, then no other, more moderate penalties can. Should 
this be the case, we could abolish all punishments and renounce to the special and general preven-
tive purpose of the criminal justice sanctions, as well (cf., G. Pálinkás, ‘Requiem for a legal institution’ 
[Requiem egy jogintézményért], Belügyi Szemle (2001/6), 63–73). The doyen of the bar, Hungary’s 
best known defence counsel, György Bárándy, also regularly makes statements regarding the need to 
reinstate the death penalty; in addition, professor József Földvári, the criminal lawyer who gave his 
expert opinion to the Constitutional Court of Hungary in 1990 in the case of the abolition of capital 
punishment (CC Decision No. 23/1990), also formulated — on several occasions during the years 
before his death (2009), first in 2002, that if he was asked today to give an expert opinion in a similar 
case, he would not be in favour of abolishing the death penalty, because its application, according to 
him, is necessary in case of serious crimes.
15) Considering that the majority of the Hungarian criminal lawyers and criminologists are aboli-
tionist, I will not provide a list of them and references to their works on the subject herein. The 
interested readers may nonetheless find the list of these works — published in Hungarian — in the 
bibliography of the following monograph: Z.J. Toth, Capital Punishment: Pros and Cons [Halálbüntetés 
pró és kontra] (Budapest: HVG-ORAC, 2012)(ISBN 978-963-258-177-4).
16) However, according to the so-called “economic paradigm” people are rational animals who weigh 
the potential advantages and disadvantages of all their activities, including legal and illegal actions, 
with each other. The (potential) criminals are also rational people responding to incentives when 
they consider whether to partake in illegitimate activities or a particular type of illegal act or to earn 
money doing righteous work. According to this theory, people choose not to commit crimes if the 
incentives motivating decent thriving or discouraging criminal lifestyle outweigh the stimulations to 
participate in unauthorised activities. These incentives, according to the most famous representa-
tive of the “economic paradigm”, Isaac Ehrlich, driving to or away from criminality can be the scope 
of legal and illegal earning possibilities in the neighbourhood of the possible criminals’ residence, 
the expected net gain from either the legal or the illegal activities available and, in the end, the 
“price” of the criminal behaviour. (cf., I. Ehrlich, ‘The deterrent effect of criminal law enforcement’, 1 
Journal of Legal Studies (1972), 259–276; and I. Ehrlich, ‘The deterrent effect of capital punishment: a 
question of life and death’, 65 American Economic Review (1975), 397–417). This “price” consists of, on 
the one hand, the contingent magnitude of the penalty to be imposed on the offender caught and, 
on the other hand, the probability of the apprehension and conviction of the perpetrator. The more 
plausible a criminal will be apprehended and convicted and the more severe the punishment that 
is to be inflicted upon culprits, the less crime is expected to be committed. In addition, at least in 
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advance the possible consequences of their act; hence, they cannot be frightened 
by the penalty of death.17 This is also true for those who commit their crimes when 
being drunk or who are motivated by an overpowering, usually sexual, instinct 
(a so-called “drive”).18 Furthermore, it cannot deter those either who themselves 
want to die, for example, political perpetrators (anarchists, terrorists); “indirect 
suiciders” who want to die but are too coward to do this by their own hands and 
want to get into such a situation where the police officers have no other choice but 
to shoot them dead or where the authorities have the possibility to sentence them 
to death and execute them;19 or suicidal murderers who, actuated by jealousy, 
murder, for example, their wives and/or their wives’ lovers, and, not wanting to 
live further, commit suicide after the murder. In the end, the threat of death does 
not deter those who deem the police will not catch them. As Beccaria wrote some 
Ehrlich’s opinion, and in contrast to the view mentioned above, this is also true for hate and passion 
crimes (see Ehrlich, ‘The deterrent effect of criminal law enforcement’, op. cit., p. 274; and I. Ehrlich, 
‘On positive methodology, ethics, and polemics in deterrence research’, 22 British Journal of 
Criminology (1982), 124–139). At the same time, John Cochran, Mitchell Chamlin and Mark Seth in 
their common paper (J.K. Cochran, M.B. Chamlin and M. Seth, ‘Deterrence or brutalization? an 
impact assessment of Oklahoma’s return to capital punishment’, 32 Criminology (1994), 107–134) 
denied Ehrlich’s statement, and, what is more, they claimed that these kind of offenses have a so-
called “brutalization effect”, that is, the awareness of executions creates an atmosphere in which 
possible culprits tend to devalue human life and, consequently, in this atmosphere, more murders 
happen than it would if executions were not carried out at all (for the conclusions, see in detail: 
Cochran et al., op. cit., pp. 107, 121–124 and 128–130. For the original conception of the brutalization 
effect, see W.J. Bowers and G.L. Pierce, ‘Deterrence or brutalization: what is the effect of executions?’, 
26 Crime and Deliquency (1980), 453–484).
17) And, of course, they cannot be frightened by any other penalty, either.
18) However, even when it comes to crimes committed under the influence of alcohol or crimes of 
passion, there is at least a moderate amount of deliberation behind one’s actions. This deliberation 
may manifest itself in the development of a typical attitude (in other words, in a general state of 
mind) towards violence, while the lack of these incentives may contribute to the development of a 
personality that does not reject destructive behaviour and is more prone to turn to violent methods 
in order to solve a matter; but it can also present itself in that short time span when the sudden 
resolve triggered by emotions is realized in the outside word since all affective acts are preceded by 
a momentary consideration during which every possible scenario is evaluated that might assist the 
enactment of the action or prevent it. If it was not so, that is, if a perpetrator had absolutely no con-
trol over his impulses and his sexual or any other instincts, in that case the perpetrator could not be 
a subject for punishment at all due to a lack of imputation and culpability (cf., Ehrlich, ‘The deter-
rent effect of criminal law enforcement’, op. cit.,, p. 274; Ehrlich, On positive methodology, ethics, and 
polemics in deterrence research’, op. cit., p. 128; J.M. Shepherd, ‘Murders of passion, execution delays, 
and the deterrence of capital punishment’, 33 Journal of Legal Studies (2004), 283–322).
19) Pamela Watkins, a very rare example, was such an offender. For the case of Watkins, see 
A.G. Amsterdam, Anthony, ‘Capital punishment’, in Bedau, The Death Penalty in America, pp. 346–
358. In Hungary, the famous offender of the bank robbery of Szena square committed the crime with 
this kind of motivation as well, and, as contrasted to Watkins, actually succeeded in his plan.
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two and a half centuries ago: “Crimes are more effectually prevented by the cer-
tainty than the severity of punishment”.20 (in addition: “It is not the intenseness 
of the pain that has the greatest effect on the mind, but its continuance. The 
more immediately after the commission of a crime a punishment is inflicted, 
the more just and useful it will be”).21 Thus, the death penalty cannot exactly 
frighten the cruellest and most brutal offenders, for example, assassins, murder-
ers for hire and so on, so those who think they are cleverer than the police officers 
and will not be apprehended. Hence, as per the abolitionists, the solution is not 
making the possible penalties more severe but making the investigations more 
effective.
By the way, both the abolitionists and the retentionists wish to prove the cor-
rectness of their standpoints on the ground of pure statistical analyses. The fault 
of these attempts (from both sides) is that they do not take into account that a 
plenty of other social trends and flows, numerous economic impacts and so on 
influence the criminality in a given state. Let me present only one example, my 
mother country, Hungary. In Hungary, the Constitutional Court declared capital 
punishment unconstitutional right after the end of the transition to democracy, in 
October 1990, by Constitutional Court Decision No. 23/1990 (31 October). Hence, 
the last year that we can consider a year with capital punishment is 1990 and the 
first year we can regard as a year without capital punishment is 1991. The mere 
statistical data are that, between 1975 and 1990, from a minimum of 185 to a maxi-
mum of 23722 murders, both premeditated23 and not premeditated,24 and mur-
ders of passion (or, as it is named officially in the Hungarian penal law, voluntary 
manslaughters committed with provocation or in the heat of passion) occurred 
every single year25 (in these occurrences manslaughters as negligent crimes are 
not involved). This means that the number of murders in Hungary was almost the 
same in each year between 1975 and 1990, approximately 210 on average, with a 
margin of plus or minus 10%. In 1991, the first death-penalty-free year, this number 
20) C. Beccaria, ‘An Essay On Crimes and Punishments [1764]’, e-book. (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty 
Fund, 2011), p. 49, available online at: http://files.libertyfund.org/files/2193/Beccaria_1476_EBk_v6.0 
.pdf.
21) Beccaria, op. cit., p. 51.
22) For the Hungarian statistical data, cf., Hungarian Statistical Yearbooks, 1975-2011.
23) Intentional killing with malicious aforethought.
24) Homicides.
25) In detail: in 1975: 206; in 1976: 237; in 1977: 219; in 1978: 185; in 1979: 230; in 1980: 200; in 1981: 214; in 
1982: 190; in 1983: 215; in 1984: 205; in 1985: 191; in 1986: 233; in 1987: 203; in 1988: 206; in 1989: 191; in 
1990: 201 murders and involuntary manslaughters took place per year. Nevertheless, the number of 
the latter is not worth taking into account, since those criminal acts that are qualified as “involuntary 
manslaughters” occur very rarely, usually once or twice (or not once at all) per year.
0002018497.INDD   45 7/3/2013   10:37:01 AM
46 Z.J. Toth / European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 21 (2013) 37–58
rose to 307; in 1992, this number was exactly the same (307), and then, between 
1993 and 1998, it fluctuated between 271 and 313.26 Thus, it can be seen that the 
frequency of violent intentional killings was 1.5-times higher in the years after the 
abolition of capital punishment than in the years before that.
Based on these figures, retentionists could draw the conclusion that the aboli-
tion of the death penalty made the potential murderers more unflinching, more 
desperate and more fearless, but, in fact, this inference may be false, or at least, to 
be more exact, it lacks soundness. Why? First, the abolition of capital punishment 
happened just in the time when Hungary underwent the transition from state 
socialism to democracy. This transition was accompanied by the anomic state of 
society in a Durkheimian sense. This means that sharp, drastic and rapid changes 
cause a value crisis among the members of a society (called anomie), manifesting 
in, among other things, more frequent deviancy (for example, increased number 
of suicides, alcoholism and crimes). Furthermore, in Hungary this transition went 
together with liquidation of state companies, thereby dismissing lots of employ-
ees, making them unemployed; there was growing poverty and international 
organised crime turned up, all of these being criminogenic factors. This explana-
tion (the explanation of anomie) is also corroborated by not only the increasing 
murder rate during these years but an increase of the total number of crimes as 
well; between 1975 and 1988 the number of crimes increased from about 120 000 
crimes up to 188 000 per year27 (on average, approximately, with a margin of plus/
minus 20%, 150 000). The political transformation began, in fact, in 1989; thus, the 
causes of the growing number of crimes started to operate in that year. This actu-
ally did manifest in the years of the political transformation, even in 1989 as well. 
Namely, in 1989, the total number of crimes was 225 000, in 1990 it was 341 000, in 
1991 it was 440 000, and then, between 1992 and 1999, it ranged from 389 000 to 
600 000.28 This means that the total number of crimes rose in a few years’ time by 
about three- or fourfold, while the number of murders increased by only 1.5-fold, 
that is, the anomic state explanation seems to be a plausible one. And there is one 
26) In 1993: 298; in 1994: 313; in 1995: 296; in 1996: 271; in 1997: 289; in 1998: 289 intentional homicides 
eventuated.
27) Annually: in 1975: 120 889; in 1976: 129 424; in 1977: 123 623; in 1978: 126 907; in 1979: 125 267; in 
1980: 130 470; in 1981: 134 914; in 1982: 139 795; in 1983: 151 505; in 1984: 157 036; in 1985: 165 816; in 1986: 
182 867; in 1987: 188 397 and in 1988: 185 344 crimes occurred.
28) In detail, the total number of crimes in 1989 was 225 393; in 1990: 341 061; in 1991: 440 370; in 1992: 
447 222; in 1993: 400 935; in 1994: 389 451; in 1995: 502 036; in 1996: 466 050; in 1997: 514 403; in 1998: 
600 621; and in 1999: 505 716. Nonetheless, it has to be mentioned that the salient value of the crime 
rate in 2008 is due to one and only offender, who defrauded nearly 80 000 people (committing, as a 
consequence of it, almost 80 000 crimes) pretending to be a parking attendant and, hence, to be 
entitled to get money from drivers in order for them to be able to park in places where the parking 
in fact was free of charge.
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more argument that corroborates this scenario. Namely, after 1999, when the 
shocking effects of the political transformation began to fade away, the number of 
murders started to decrease tendentiously. In 2005 the number decreased below 
200 for the first time (in this year this number was only 164, and it has even for 
now been staying around 150 murders per year), and there have never been so few 
murders as in the last four years because in 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011 the number 
of murders and murders of passion were only 147, 139, 133 and 142, respectively.29 
Meanwhile, the average number of crimes did not change in essence, being 
between 394 000 and 465 000 from 2000 until 2011.30
Based on these figures abolitionists could draw the conclusion that the abroga-
tion of the former death penalty does not have any influence at all either on total 
criminality or on the former death-eligible offences. However, this latter inference 
is unsound, too. Since we are simply not able to learn what would have happened 
if capital punishment had not been abolished (it is, theoretically, possible that if 
capital punishment had not been abolished, then the number of murders would 
have dropped even more than it actually did), we cannot infer from pure statisti-
cal figures either that this kind of penalty deterred or that it did not deter some 
part of the potential murderers.
In the end, as regards the issue of the empirically-based deterrent or non- 
deterrent effect of capital punishment, it is worth reviewing the figures on 
recidivism. In Hungary, of those convicted of homicides, the number of simple 
recidivists varied between 3 and 14 in the last few years (between 1997 and 2011).31 
Each year between 1997 and 2011, there was a minimum of 4 and a maximum 
of 23 repeat offenders among those convicted for homicide.32 And, what is the 
most important in this aspect, the numbers of habitual recidivists fluctuated 
29) For the period between 1999 and 2011 these figures are: in 1999: 253; in 2000: 205; in 2001: 254; in 
2002: 203; in 2003: 228; in 2004: 209; in 2005: 164; in 2006: 174; in 2007: 154; in 2008v 147; in 2009: 139; in 
2010: 133; and in 2011: 142.
30) Annually: in 2000: 450 673; in 2001: 465 694; in 2002: 420 782; in 2003: 413 343; in 2004: 418 883; in 
2005: 436 522; in 2006: 425 941; in 2007: 426 914; in 2008: 408 407; in 2009: 394 034; in 2010: 447 186; 
and in 2011: 451 371.
31) According to point 14 of Section  137 of the Criminal Code of Hungary, “recidivist” means the 
perpetrator of a premeditated criminal act, if such person was previously sentenced to imprison-
ment without probation for a premeditated criminal act, or the execution of such imprisonment has 
been suspended in part, and three years have not yet passed since the last day of serving the term of 
imprisonment or the last day of the term of limitation until the perpetration of another criminal act.
32) Pursuant to point 16 of Section 137 of the Criminal Code of Hungary, “repeat offender” means 
a person who has been sentenced to imprisonment without probation as a recidivist prior to the 
perpetration of a premeditated criminal act, or the execution of such imprisonment has been 
suspended in part, and three years have not yet passed since the last day of serving the term of 
imprisonment or the last day of the term of limitation until the perpetration of another criminal act 
punishable by imprisonment.
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between 1 and 8 per year amongst the homicide offenders.33 According to the 
Hungarian Criminal Code, “habitual recidivists” are those recidivists who commit 
on both occasions the same crime or a crime similar in nature. As for homicide, 
the “same crime” committed again by the offender is, apparently, another homi-
cide,34 and a “crime similar in nature” is an offence by which the perpetrator 
causes death or serious injury to his/her victim(s) and/or by which he/she endan-
gers a lot of people, in both the cases, intentionally.35
As for the second approach, however, one might think it could, in thesi, be 
found out whether the threat of death has any influence on the future behaviour 
of would-be murderers, and, to achieve this goal, the motivation of these potential 
offenders could be investigated by a more sophisticated methodology using the 
tools of econometry. Unfortunately, it proved to be a hopeless attempt, since even 
among economists there is no agreement on whether the effect of the legal exis-
tence or practical application of the death penalty on potential capital offenders 
can be measured at all or, if it can be gauged, whether this supposed deterrent 
effect exists or not. It is certain that much depends on the choice not only of the 
sample periods or the regression method applied but of the contingent precon-
ception as well. Consequently, so many researchers, so many results.36
The truth is that, in fact, neither the existence nor the non-existence of the 
deterrent effect of capital punishment can be proven. We simply are not able to 
get to know whether there is anyone who planned to commit a murder but did not 
do that because he got frightened of the possible penalty of death, albeit in lack of 
the death penalty he would have committed this offence. Since he did not do that 
effectively, we can never be certain that the murder would have happened or not, 
simply because none of us is a fortune teller, oracle or prophet.
33) Since the number of habitual recidivists is of a great significance in terms of the operation of 
deterrence, I recite the figures thereof annually. In 1997 three, in 1998 one, in 1999 four, in 2000 three, 
in 2001 four, in 2002 two, in 2003 five, in 2004 also five, in 2005 three, in 2006 five, in 2007 eight, in 
2008 four, in 2009 two, in 2010 one, and, in the end, in 2011 also 1 offender were qualified as habitual 
recidivists (for other, non-Hungarian examples, cf., J.K. Marquis, ‘Truth and consequences: the pen-
alty of death’, in: Bedau and Cassell, Debating the Death Penalty, pp. 117–151).
34) Except, of course, for manslaughter as negligent crime.
35) According to paragraph a of Subsection 5 of Section 167 of the Criminal Code of Hungary, within 
the meaning of habitual recidivism, the following shall be construed as crimes of similar nature: 
voluntary manslaughter committed with provocation or in the heat of passion; genocide; aggravated 
cases of kidnapping and violence against a superior or a law enforcement officer; aggravated cases of 
acts of terrorism, seizure of an aircraft, any means of railway, water or road transport or any means 
of freight transport and insurrection, if the act causing death is perpetrated intentionally.
36) For the results of the contemporary econometric studies on the contingent deterrent effect of 
the death penalty see J.Z. Toth, ‘The deterrent effect of the death penalty — from an econometric 
point of view’, De iurisprudentia et iure publico (2012/1–2), 151–186, available online at: http://www 
.dieip.com/2012_6_1_szam.pdf.
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The matter of judicial errors and, as a consequence thereof, wrongful convic-
tions also prompt a heated discussion between the abolitionists and the reten-
tionists. In relation to the legal possibility for courts to impose death sentences on 
capital offenders, the greatest danger is the judicial murder, that is, with a German 
technical term, the so-called Justizmord. In the USA, from 1973 until recently, 141 
death row prisoners have been exonerated from their death cells on the grounds 
that actually it was not them but somebody else who committed those crimes of 
which they were accused and convicted.37
There is no knowledge of innocent people executed in Hungary, with, certainly, 
the exception of the political show trials following the revolution of 1956; how-
ever, we do know of 2 persons who were sentenced to death before the political 
transition of 1989–1990 without them having committed the crimes of which they 
were accused, but their innocence was proven before the death sentence could 
have been carried out. Nevertheless, wrongful convictions occurred even after 
1990, which proves that there is no such infallible criminal procedure law system 
where only appropriate and solid judgements are made. The most famous exam-
ple of this is the so-called Mor bank robbery. Mor is a small town where a bank 
was robbed in May 2002 by several gunmen who murdered all 8 people that were 
on the premises. The suspects, Ede Kaiser and Laszlo Hajdu, were apprehended 
shortly thereafter, while a third alleged perpetrator was supposed to be still on the 
loose by the police. The court adjudged Kaiser guilty of aggravated murder as a 
co-actor and sentenced him to life without parole, whereas Hajdu was condemned 
to 15 years of prison as an accomplice. The appellate court later annulled Hajdu’s 
sentence, ordered the court of first instance to retrial the case but, as a final deci-
sion, upheld Kaiser’s punishment. Only when the real offenders had been arrested 
did it become apparent that they had nothing to do with the slaughter. Many a 
lawyer is confident that, if capital punishment had been in effect in Hungary at 
that time, Kaiser would have already been executed by the time the real perpetra-
tors were apprehended. Obviously, Kaiser is only legally innocent in this case, as 
he made a living from robberies, but he did not commit the murder which he was 
charged with and convicted of.
When inspecting faulty judicial decisions it is important to take discrimination 
into consideration, as it is not a rare occurrence that the judge is also imbued with 
social prejudices and, as a result, makes a — sometimes wrong — decision on the 
basis of his own biases. This is a universal attitude of humankind rather than an 
American peculiarity, which led to wrongful convictions in Hungary as well and 
will always do as long as adjudication is made by humans. That is why it makes 
a huge difference whether there is a possibility for the infliction of irreversible 
37) See DPIC Fact Sheet (25 October 2012), p. 2, available online at: http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/
documents/FactSheet.pdf.
0002018497.INDD   49 7/3/2013   10:37:02 AM
50 Z.J. Toth / European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 21 (2013) 37–58
sentences in a particular legal system or not. The case of Denes Pusoma is an 
excellent example showing that mistakes and errors can take place at any time. 
We are not talking about a capital punishment case here because Pusoma was not 
accused of murder and not even of homicide, but was charged with battery caus-
ing death. Nonetheless, the procedural errors in question could well occur in any 
homicide or murder case.
Pusoma was an extremely poor Roma (gipsy) man who earned a living by doing 
odd jobs. An elderly woman was killed in a small Hungarian village on the evening 
of 16 March 1994, and Pusoma was charged with this crime shortly thereafter. 
Pusoma did indeed visit the house at noon on that day where the witnesses saw 
him quarrel with the woman and leave upset afterwards. The mentally disabled 
brother of the victim’s neighbour testified that at the time of the crime, that is, in 
the evening, he had seen Pusoma entering the house and reappearing later with 
his clothes covered in blood. The court-appointed forensic expert said that the 
testimony was realistic and probably true. Later in the investigation, another per-
son in pre-trial detention, with whom he shared a cell and who wished to be put 
under house arrest (for this reason he promised the public prosecutor to find evi-
dence for Pusoma’s guilt if he was going to be granted his request), handed a letter 
to the authorities which, according to him, had been written by Pusoma and 
which he opened out of curiosity. The letter contained a confession in Pusoma’s 
handwriting, as attested by an expert. The circumstances of the writing of the 
letter are still not known, but the intellectually handicapped person admitted to 
the crime.
There was an additional piece of evidence against his innocence: the scent sam-
ple supposedly originating from the crime scene (from the room of the victim) 
was identified to be the same as Pusoma’s by two dogs on 5 different occasions, 
while a match with other persons’ scents was deemed implausible. However, it 
was not documented, either in the pictures taken by the police or in the onsite 
investigation report, that the scent sample had truly come from the crime scene, 
the lady’s bedroom. In other words, there was no proof that the scent sample 
(which undoubtedly was Pusoma’s) had been taken in the bedroom and not in the 
kitchen where Pusoma had demonstrably and actually been. At the same time, 
the police had been disregarding any fact interfering with their theory all along 
the investigation, even though several witnesses stated that they had seen two 
strange men near the house of the victim at the presumed time of the crime.
In the end, after the judgement of the court of first instance had come into 
effect and Pusoma had already been serving his prison term against which he did 
not lodge an appeal (to be more precise, his incoherent request was not regarded 
as an appeal), by a stroke of luck (the real perpetrators were apprehended) it 
turned out that the crime had been committed by the two men who had been 
seen near the crime scene. Thus, in these proceedings a number of mistakes led to 
the conviction of an innocent person: mistakes made by the police; by the public 
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prosecutor, who did not instruct the police to conduct a more thorough investiga-
tion and to inspect other possible scenarios as well and who accepted the offer 
of a police informant, giving credits unconditionally to the evidence supplied by 
him; by the court which failed to give a careful consideration to the aforemen-
tioned errors and which based the credibility of the evidence only on one of the 
contradictory experts’ opinions on the reliability of the mentally disabled eyewit-
ness; and by the assigned counsel, who did not warn his defendant about the con-
sequences of an overdue appeal. Moreover, although it was his ethical obligation 
as an attorney to do so, he did not even file an appeal in his own name.
Sadly, the story of Denes Pusoma did not end with a happy end: after it had been 
found out that he had been falsely imprisoned, his prison term was suspended and 
he was exonerated, but when he claimed for compensation from the state for 
immaterial damages, his case was dismissed because the Hungarian law requires 
the defendant to lodge an appeal against the first-instance sentence in order to be 
entitled for compensation. Not much later, Pusoma committed suicide.
The cases of Mor and Pusoma are only two random instances of wrongful con-
victions. However, numerous erroneous judicial decisions that were not heard of 
are highly likely to have happened besides the known ones, even in capital cases, 
and only a few of them will be discovered even in the future. Therefore, simply the 
fact that there is no knowledge of ill-founded death sentences and executions in 
Hungary or in any country does not necessarily mean that such incidents have not 
happened. Plenty of judicial murders (wrongful imposition of the death penalty) 
have not been — and most of them will never be — discovered because the re-
examination of a case concluded with capital punishment is useless; the conse-
quences of the sentence are irreversible as one cannot be revived, one’s death 
cannot be redressed; and pointing out their own mistakes and drawing atten-
tion to them is not in the authorities’ interest. Mostly, such errors were, and still 
at present are, discovered only if the perpetrator had been apprehended on 
account of another investigation and, among others, they confessed to that par-
ticular crime as well, of which somebody else was accused (as well as convicted) 
previously and mentioned circumstances in their statement only they could know. 
Otherwise, cases concluded with execution were not further inspected. Evidently, 
once the authorities have convicted somebody and executed them, they do not 
attempt to reveal a possible slip.38 The situation has essentially remained the 
same up to this day: the closed but debatable cases are re-opened only for strong 
reasons — and usually only when the convict’s relatives demand it. Hence, 
although most of the old cases of debatable nature could be cleared up, it is very 
38) That is why, for example, the Hungarian police deserve praise, for their work led to the 
re-opening of the case of the Mor bank robbery claiming the life of 8 people despite the alleged 
perpetrator having been convicted with binding force.
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plausible that the vast majority of the past judicial murders will never come to 
light. That is, wrongful judicial decisions were, are and will always be made,39 and 
the abolitionists are right in that the easiest and most risk-free way of avoiding 
judicial murders is to keep away from the application of capital punishment.40
However, throughout almost the whole history of Hungary,41 until the adoption 
of CC Decision No. 23/1990 by the Hungarian Constitutional Court, despite any 
doubts, on the one hand, whether the application of this legal institution serves 
the goal of deterrence or, on the other hand, it might be imposed against innocent 
people, capital punishment was a regular sanction (poena ordinaria) for lots of 
felonies. Astonishingly, at least at first glance, the death penalty was applied most 
frequently not in the Middle Ages but in the 20th century. There have never been 
so many legal executions in Hungary than during World War One and Two; how-
ever, because of a lack of reliable statistical data the precise number of the execu-
tions is not known to date. There were also numerous death penalties imposed in 
the 1950s, mainly in the years of retaliation after the Revolution of 1956. Only in 
1961 did the situation return to normal, when implementation of martial law 
stopped for good and all. In this year, the Parliament of the People’s Republic 
of Hungary passed the Act V of 1961 on the Criminal Code that allowed the inflic-
tion of the death penalty for altogether 31 criminal offences (for 9 crimes against 
the state,42 2 crimes against peace and humanity,43 12 military offences44 and 
39) For other, non-Hungarian examples, see S.B. Bright, ‘Why the United States will join the Rest of 
the World in abandoning capital punishment’, in Bedau and Cassell, Debating the Death Penalty, 
pp. 152–182; as for, specifically, the possible lack of effective representation, see E. Kreitzberg, ‘Death 
without justice’, 35 Santa Clara Law Review (1994–1995), 485–518; I. Mickenberg, ‘Drunk, sleeping, 
and incompetent lawyers: is it possible to keep innocent people off death row?’, 29 University of 
Dayton Law Review (2003–2004), 319–327.
40) It is of course possible that by introducing increased procedural guarantees (e.g., independent 
indictments from 2 or 3 public prosecutors should be necessary for a death warrant, or the judicial 
council should only be able to inflict the death penalty when they are unanimous in their decision), 
the number of ill-founded death sentences could be reduced in those legal systems in which 
this punishment is still in use, but the complete elimination of possible errors could still not be 
accomplished.
41) For this issue, see in detail J. Z. Toth, The Universal and Hungarian History of the Institution of 
Capital Punishment [A halálbüntetés intézményének egyetemes és magyarországi jogtörténete] 
(Budapest: Századvég, 2010)(ISBN 978-963-7340-80-2).
42) In parentheses are the section and subsection numbers of the Hungarian Criminal Code (Act V 
of 1961): Conspiracy (116, para. 3; 117, para. 3); riot (120, para. 2); malicious mischief (124, para. 2); sabo-
tage (125, para. 2); assault (126, paras 1–2); high treason (129, para. 2); aid and comfort for the enemy 
(130, para. 1); espionage (131, para. 3); crimes against other socialist states (133, para. 1).
43) Genocide (137, para. 1); cruelty in time of war (139, para. 2).
44) Desertion (312, para. 2); desertion abroad (313, para. 2); refusal of military service (315, para. 1); 
mutiny (316, paras 3–4); disobedience of a military order from a commander (317, para. 3); violence 
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8 common offences45), but in no case this sanction was qualified as compulsory; 
the judge had the possibility to impose an imprisonment sentence for 10–15 years 
each time or, after 1972, an imprisonment for life. The Criminal Code’s Amendment, 
the Law Decree No. 28 of 1971, entered into force on 1 January, 1972, reduced the 
number of the crimes punishable by death to 26,46 although a new capital felony, 
seizure of aircraft, was introduced as well. In 1978, a new Criminal Code, namely, 
Act IV of 1978, was enacted which is in force even today.47 This law stipulated capi-
tal punishment also for 26 offences, one of which was a new one, act of terrorism, 
while it abolished the penalty of death for riot of prisoners.48
Meanwhile, the number of the death sentences imposed persistently decreased 
(in the 1960s there were 129 death sentences, in the 1970s there were 47 and in the 
1980s there were only 32). Of these, in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s 50, 13 and 3 death 
sentences, respectively, were imposed under military jurisdiction and 79, 34 and 
against a superior or a law enforcement officer (318, para. 4); disobedience of a guard order (326, 
para. 3); violation of rules for duty of alert (327, para. 3); commander’s breach of duty in a combat 
situation (331, para. 1); evasion of combat obligation (332, para. 1); compromising combat readiness 
(334, para. 2); violence against a war emissary (338, para. 2).
45) Riot of prisoners (186, para. 3); public endangerment (committed in respect of social prop-
erty, causing “particularly considerable” damage or pecuniary injury) (190, para. 2); homicide (with 
aggravating circumstances) (253, para. 2); theft (291, para. 1), embezzlement (292, para. 1), fraud 
(293, para. 1) and misappropriation of funds (294, para. 1) committed, either as part of a criminal 
conspiracy or as a recidivist, in respect of social property causing “particularly considerable” damage 
(295, para. 3); and robbery (299, para. 1) committed also in respect of social property causing 
“particularly considerable” damage (299, para. 4).
46) It abolished the threat of death for offences against property, that is, for theft, embezzlement, 
fraud, misappropriation of funds and robbery committed in respect of social property, item, for 
public endangerment.
47) This paper was written at the end of 2012 and at the beginning of 2013. However, 1 July 2013 
Hungary’s new Criminal Code, Act C of 2012, will enter into force in which the present regulation will 
change in several points. Therefore, hereafter when I write about the present situation of the 
Hungarian penal law stipulations, it means the provisions being operative before this time.
48) In the original text of the Act IV of 1978 the death-eligible crimes were as follows (in parentheses 
the section and subsection numbers thereof): conspiracy (139, para. 3); riot (140, para. 4); malicious 
mischief (141, para. 3); sabotage (142, para. 2); assault (143, para. 2); high treason (144, para. 2); aid and 
comfort for the enemy (146, para. 1); espionage (147, para. 2); crimes against other socialist states (151, 
para. 1); genocide (155, para. 1); violence against the civilian population (158, para. 2); commission of 
war crimes (160, para. 1); violence against a war emissary (163, para. 2); desertion (343, para. 4); eva-
sion of military service (346, para. 1); refusal of military service (347, para.); breach of discipline in 
the line of duty (348. (3)); mutiny (352, para. (3)); disobedience (354, para. 3); violence against a 
superior or a law enforcement officer (355, para. 5); compromising combat readiness (363, para. 2); 
commander’s breach of duty in a combat situation (364, para. 1); evasion of combat obligation (365, 
para. 1); homicide (with aggravating circumstances) (166, para. 2); act of terrorism (causing death) 
(261, para. 2); seizure of aircraft (causing death) (262, para. 2).
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29 under civil jurisdiction.49 This means that the average number of the death 
sentences related to common offenses was 7.9 in the 1960s, 3.4 in the 1970s and 3.1 
in the 1980s.50,51 However, the process of the abolition actually started only in 1983 
when a conference was organized by the Hungarian Lawyers Alliance to discuss 
the future of capital punishment in the Hungarian criminal law. Nevertheless, the 
Hungarian abolitionist movement gained strength in deed when the League 
Against Capital Punishment was formed in 1989. Yet in 1989, the Parliament abol-
ished capital punishment for political crimes, that is, all crimes against the state 
by Act XVI of 1989.52 In the subsequent year the League sought a ruling from the 
newly established Hungarian Constitutional Court to declare the death penalty 
unconstitutional on the ground that it was contrary to the right to life protected by 
Section 54 of the Hungarian Constitution, stating, in addition, that this sanction is 
irreparable and irreversible, could not be justified ethically, and unsuitable in pre-
venting or deterring the commission of serious crimes. Eventually, this happened 
in 1990 by the Constitutional Court Decision No. 23/1990. From there on the prac-
tice of capital punishment has been irrevocably forbidden in Hungary.53
It is interesting that, in 1990, capital punishment was abolished in Hungary not 
for the same reasons as in other countries, namely not because its deterrent effect 
is not proven or not because it is to be feared that, owing to wrongful convictions, 
innocent people are sentenced to death and executed. Actually, these pragmatic 
aspects did not play a role in its abolition; instead, the statutory rules that regu-
lated this legal institution were annulled by the Hungarian Constitutional Court 
solely for reasons of moral requirements and the constitutional constraints rest-
ing on them. For instance, in the United States the Supreme Court’s Furman  
49) In detail: under civil jurisdiction, between 1960 and 1969 this number was annually 6, 14, 10, 5, 7, 
9, 10, 9, 5 and 4; between 1970 and 1979 it was annually 6, 3, 6, 7, 4, 3, 1, 1, 1 and 2; between 1980 and 
1989 it was annually 5, 3, 5, 3, 1, 2, 1, 5, 3 and 1; under military jurisdiction, between 1960 and 1969 this 
number was annually13, 4, 2, 0, 0, 2, 10, 6, 6 and 7; between 1970 and 1979 it was annually 5, 2, 0, 1, 3, 0, 
1, 0, 0, and 1; in the end, between 1980 and 1989 it was annually 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0 and 0 (cf., T. Horvath 
(ed.), The Abolition of Capital Punishment in Hungary. A Documantary Compilation [A halálbüntetés 
megszüntetése Magyarországon. Dokumentumgyűjtemény] (Miskolc: The League Against Capital 
Punishment, 1991), pp. 65–66; A. Firon, Cain Stamp. Shall we pension off the executioner for good? 
[Káinbélyeg. Nyugdíjazzuk-e végleg a hóhért?] (Budapest: Panorama, 1991), p. 101).
50) Cf., Horvath, op. cit., p. 45.
51) Interestingly, during this period of time, the frequency of the executions themselves did not 
decrease the same way. Namely, while in the 1970s the average number of executions was 2.4 per year, 
this number was 2.6 per year in the 1980s (in detail: between 1970 and 1989, the number of the execu-
tions actually carried out was 2, 5, 4, 2, 5, 2, 1, 1, 2, 4, 4, 3, 4, 2, 2, 0, 5, 2, 0 and 0). (cf., Firon, op. cit., p. 101.)
52) This law was promulgated and came into effect on 15 June, 1989.
53) The last execution in Hungary was carried out on 14 July 1988 when the multiple murderer Erno 
Vadasz was hanged. Nonetheless, the last death sentences were imposed in 1989, but they would 
never be carried out.
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decision passed on 29 June 197254 held on a 5 to 4 vote55 that the imposition 
and carrying out of capital punishment, as then practised, was unconstitutional 
because on the one hand it breached the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and 
unusual punishment, since the infliction of the death penalty was “arbitrary and 
capricious”, and, on the other hand, it violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal 
protection clause as well. In fact, these arguments were virtually not, or not only, 
legal but rather practical ones.56
In contrast, the Constitutional Court of Hungary declared capital punishment 
unconstitutional by the CC Decision No. 23/1990 (31 October), since it deemed 
that every person has an inalienable right to life and human dignity of which 
nobody shall be deprived. The Subsection (1) of Section 54 of the previous Con-
stitution of the Republic of Hungary (Act XX of 1949 revised and restated 
by Act XXXI of 1989) says that “[i]n the Republic of Hungary everyone has the 
inherent right to life and to human dignity. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of 
these rights”. According to the Constitutional Court’s argumentation, the Section 8 
of the Constitution of Hungary states that “[t]he Republic of Hungary recognizes 
the inviolable and inalienable fundamental human rights. Ensuring the respect 
and protection of these shall be a primary obligation of the State”. In addition: 
“[t]he right to life and human dignity are considered fundamental rights, whose 
exercise may not be suspended or limited even in a state of emergency, exigency 
or peril”. Conversely, the literal meaning of Subsection 1 of Section 54 allowed for 
state organs to take somebody’s life if this killing cannot be regarded as “arbitrary”. 
54) Furman v. Georgia (408 U.S. 238). This case consists of virtually three different cases (Furman v. 
Georgia, Jackson v. Georgia, and Branch v. Texas) known jointly as Furman v. Georgia (see in detail, 
H.A. Bedau (ed.), Most death penalties are unconstitutional: Furman v. Georgia (1972), in The Death 
Penalty in America, pp. 253–270).
55) The nine Justices can be divided into three categories: retentionists, abolitionists and neutrals. 
The retentionists or revivalists voted for the maintenance of capital punishment. These Justices are 
also called “constructionists” because they are committed to the exclusive legislative power of the 
Congress. There were four of them (Harry Blackmun, Warren Burger, Lewis Powell and William 
Rehnquist), that deemed that once the legislator ruled something, the Supreme Court do not have 
the right to change this will. Two Justices (William Brennan and Thurgood Marshall) were abolition-
ists and three (William Dougles, Potter Stewart and Byron White) were neutral and these five men’s 
votes against the death penalty resulted in the temporary ban on executions.
56) Nevertheless, this Supreme Court decision did not prevent state courts from imposing capital 
punishment on those found guilty of capital offenses, and what is more, state legislatures began 
creating new laws that complied with the requirements of the Furman decision. In 1976, a new era 
started when in Gregg v. Georgia (Gregg v. Georgia 428 U.S. 153 (1976)) the Supreme Court ruled that 
those death penalty statutes which gave the jury a discretional power to decide whether a guilty 
defendant had to be sentenced to death or not (the so-called “guided discretion death penalty stat-
utes”) could be constitutional. This decision restored the constitutionality and, thus, the applicabil-
ity of the death penalty in the United States (see in detail, H.A. Bedau (ed.), The death penalty is not 
per se unconstitutional: Gregg v. Georgia (1976), in The Death Penalty in America, pp. 271–288).
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The Court eventually ruled that the collision between Sections 8 and 54 can be 
resolved in such a way that these provisions are interpreted as not to allow capital 
punishment, but guarantee (not for the state, but for individuals) the possibility 
for proportional justified defense.57 The Court’s reason for regarding capital pun-
ishment as unconstitutional was unique and peerless in the history of constitu-
tional law. As per the Court, “[h]uman life and human dignity form an inseparable 
unity and have a greater value than anything else. Accordingly the rights to human 
life and human dignity form an indivisible and unrestrainable fundamental right 
which is the source of and the precondition for several other fundamental 
rights. […] The right to human life and dignity as an absolute value create a limita-
tion upon the criminal power of the State.”58 This decision was adopted on an 
8-1 vote, that is, almost unanimously.59
57) According to Section 29 of Act IV of 1978 on the Criminal Code of Hungary, “[n]o punishment 
shall be imposed upon a person for any action that is necessary to prevent an unlawful attack against 
his person or his property or against the person or property of others, against the public interest, or 
an unlawful attack posing a direct threat in respect of the above.” This provision can be regarded as 
constitutional even if an offender’s potential victim causes lethal injuries to his/her attacker pro-
vided the unlawful conduct endangered the victim’s life.
58) Although with this decision and its reasoning the Constitutional Court, in considering the con-
stitutionality of the death penalty, avoided having to adopt an opinion in the legal-political debates, 
its decision, however, is questionable from other aspects. The inseparability thesis stems from the 
monistic concept of man, that is, the unity of body and soul (as, according to the Constitutional 
Court, there is no life without dignity and there is no dignity without life) which (the monistic 
concept of man) is contrary to the principle of ideological neutrality of the State. The dualistic con-
cept of man (life is expendable in order to preserving dignity) — as opposed to the monistic 
approach — would be in accordance with the ideological neutrality of the State because the dualis-
tic constitutional approach does not exclude for each individual to live their lives according to the 
monistic concept of man as a guiding principle, however, the monistic constitutional approach 
excludes the individual decision to live life according to the dualistic approach (for gains and prob-
lems of the so-called “inseparability thesis of the right to life and human dignity”, see e.g.: R. Uitz, 
‘Lessons from the Abolition of Capital Punishment in Hungary: A Fortuitous Constellation Amidst 
and Beyond Democratic Transition’, 45 Acta Juridica Hungarica (2004), 67–99). The problem with 
the reasoning of the CC Decision No. 23/1990 is that it is consciously based on questionable moral 
ethics (which problems were also revealed in the reasoning of the CC Decision No. 22/2003 on eutha-
nasia), albeit it would have been an obvious solution for the Constitutional Court to declare the 
death penalty unconstitutional on the basis of that it was in breach of Subsection 2 of Section 54 of 
the Constitution, which provision states that “[n]o one shall be subjected to torture, to cruel, inhu-
man or degrading treatment or punishment”. Considering that the death penalty is undoubtedly a 
cruel and degrading punishment, a reasoning based on this would have been more sound and less 
debatable (for a criticism of the Constitutional Court’s monistic concept of man, see J.Z. Toth, ‘The 
past and future of the Inseparability Thesis in the light of the old Constitution and the new 
Fundamental Law’ [Az oszthatatlansági doktrína múltja a régi Alkotmány, és jövője az új Alaptörvény 
fényében], in T. Drinóczi and A. Jakab (eds), Constitutionalisation in Hungary [Alkotmányozás 
Magyarországon]. Vol. 1 (Budapest: Pázmány Press, 2013), pp. 275–304).
59) The one and only dissenting opinion was that of Justice Peter Schmidt. Nevertheless, even he 
agreed with the uselessness and inhumanity of the death penalty, but deemed that the Constitutional 
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Although capital punishment has been abrogated, there is a possibility in 
the Hungarian law for a cruel and grave offender not to endanger again the 
decent members of society since criminal courts can impose life sentences 
without the possibility of parole on those committing certain severe crimes, 
causing death to their victims. Life imprisonment (either without parole, or 
with the possibility of reviewing after a certain time whether the criminal 
would already be able to readapt into society) is indeed necessary since there 
are criminals who may still mean a threat to society decades after their incarcera-
tion. Therefore, it is desirable — strictly on a pragmatic and not moral basis — 
to have the legal possibility in a country to keep a criminal in prison until he 
no longer means a threat to society, however, without risking to apply an 
irreparable, irrecoverable sanction against an innocent person, due to a poten-
tial  error of the judge. Consequently, life imprisonment may be considered a 
necessary and, simultaneously, sufficient legal consequence instead of capital 
punishment.
In the Hungarian penal law, life sentences are of two kinds. According to the 
Act IV of 1978 on the Criminal Code, imprisonment may be imposed for life or 
for a definitive period of time.60 If the sentence is life imprisonment, then it 
either shall establish the earliest date of eligibility for parole with a minimum of 
20 or 30 years,61 or shall preclude any eligibility for parole.62,63 The legal institution 
Court has no power to dissolve a collision between contradictory constitutional rules, since it is 
the Parliament’s exclusive right and obligation. As he wrote: “[w]hile the interpretation of the 
Constitution falls within the competence of the Constitutional Court, it is the right and obligation of 
the Parliament, the body empowered to frame or to change the Constitution, to resolve the conflict 
between the provisions of the Constitution. Such powers may not be assumed by the Constitutional 
Court. Therefore, in my opinion, the Constitutional Court should state that it lacks such a power, and 
should call the Parliament’s attention to the necessity of eliminating the conflict. This would not 
exclude the possibility for the Constitutional Court to list all the current arguments against capital 
punishment”.
60) Subsection 1 of Section 40.
61) If the court has not precluded eligibility for parole, the earliest date of release on parole shall be, 
as a general rule, after serving a term of twenty years, or, exceptionally, at least a term of thirty years, 
if the life imprisonment was imposed for a criminal act that is punishable without any period of 
limitation. An interesting characteristic of this stipulation is that, in fact, the exception functions as 
the principal rule because there are more crimes in the Criminal Code that are punishable with life 
imprisonment and without any period of limitation (e.g., homicide with aggravating circumstances) 
than those punishable therewith but within a certain period of time (e.g., abuse of narcotic drugs).
62) Subsection 1 of Section 47/A.
63) Eligibility for parole can be excluded by the court in connection with the following crimes: vio-
lent crimes committed by using actual force against a person or a thing, attempt to overturn consti-
tutional order by force (Subsection 1 of Section  1390, aggravated cases of sabotage (Subsection  2 
of Section  142), genocide (Subsection 1 of Section  155), apartheid (Subsections 1 and 3 of Sec-
tion 157), aggravated cases of violence against the civilian population (Subsection 2 of Section 158), 
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of life without parole, however, was introduced into the Hungarian criminal law 
in 1993 by Act XVII of 1993 on the Amendment to the Criminal Code. This law 
came into effect on 15 May 1993, stipulating that a person sentenced to life impris-
onment may not be released on parole if he is sentenced to another term of life 
imprisonment.64 Nevertheless, this provision did not allow for courts to impose 
life without parole on those who had not been sentenced to life imprisonment 
until their convictions. The legislature opened the door for criminal courts to 
impose “actual life sentences” or “whole life tariffs” in deed when permitted the 
application of this kind of sanction even against those who committed certain 
serious crimes, typically homicides with aggravating circumstances,65 on the first 
occasion. This occurred in 1998 by Act LXXXVII of 1998 which entered into force 
on 1 March 1999; from that date Hungarian criminal courts sentenced some two 
dozen offenders to life without parole. Albeit the Constitutional Court of Hungary 
had been reviewing the constitutionality of this legal institution,66 in the end, it 
could not reach a decision in the case since, in the meantime, the Parliament, 
as a constituent authority, enacted Hungary’s new constitution, the Fundamen-
tal  (“Basic”) Law of Hungary (as of 25 April 2011), that explicitly stipulates that 
sentences of life imprisonment without parole may be imposed for, and only 
for violent intentional crimes.67 Therefore, so long as this constitutional provi-
sion  is in effect the Constitutional Court will not be permitted to declare it 
unconstitutional.
commission of war crimes (Section 160), use of a weapon prohibited by international convention 
(Subsection 1 of Section 160/A), aggravated cases of violence against a war emissary (Subsection 2 
of Section  163), aggravated cases of homicide (Subsection 2 of Section  166), aggravated cases of 
kidnapping (Subsections 3 and 4 of Section  175/A), aggravated cases of trafficking in human 
beings (Subsection 5 of Section 175/B), aggravated cases of public endangerment (Subsection 3 of 
Section 259), acts of terrorism (Subsection 1 of Section 261), aggravated cases of unlawful seizure of 
an aircraft, of any means of railway, water or road transport or of any means of freight trans-
port (Subsection 2 of Section 262), aggravated cases of mutiny (Subsections 3 and 4 of Section 352), 
aggravated cases of violence against a superior or a law enforcement officer (Subsection 5 of 
Section  355), aggravated cases of compromising combat readiness (Subsection 2 of Section  363), 
commander’s breach of duty (Section 364) and evasion of combat obligation (Section 365).
64) This provision was originally been placed under Subsection 4 of Section 47/A but now, according 
to other changes of the regulation of life imprisonment, it is in Subsection 2 of Section 47/C.
65) In Hungarian criminal law, a homicide (actually, a “murder”) can be qualified as aggravated 
homicide (murder) if the homicide is committed: with premeditation; for financial advantage; or for 
another malicious motive or purpose; with extreme brutality; against a public official or a foreign 
public official during or because of his official proceedings, against a person performing public 
duties when carrying out such duties, or against a person providing assistance to or acting in defence 
of such persons performing official or public duties; on more than one person; endangering the life 
of a great many people; as a habitual recidivist; against a person under the age of fourteen; against a 
person incapable of self-defence.
66) It examined whether the actual life sentence constitutes a violation of right to human dignity.
67) Article IV (2).
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